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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
OLIVE H. PRESTON,

\

Plaintiff and AppeUant, (

-vs-

GEORGE. P. LAMB and T. J. SPEROS, (
Defend.ants and Respovndents.

Case No.
11001

J

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
THE HONORABLE MERRILL C. FAUX,
DISTRICT JUDGE.
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MABEY, BRADFORD &
MARSDEN

Seventh Floor Continental
Bank Building
Salt !Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defend.ants
and Respondents

1700 University Club Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellwnt
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OL,IVE H. PRESTON,
Plaintiff and AppellMtt,
-vs-

Case No.

GEORGE P. LAMB and T. J. SPEROS,

11001

Defendarnts and Respo'Yldents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by
the plaintiff when she fell in the defendants' restaurant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted defendants' Motion for
8ummary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts is incorrect. The
material facts are these:
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George P. Lamb is the owner of Lamb's Grill Cafe
at 169 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. He has
been in the restaurant business for 49 years, 28 at
thiR location. (Deposition of Margaret E. Stoll, et al.,
pp. 13, 14.)
On December 2.t, 196..Jo, Plaintiff, an employee of
Standard Optical Company, 155 South Main Street,
accompaniPd by Gerald G. Hugentobler, walked to Lamb's
for a cup of coffee. It had just started to sprinkle.
1 DPposition of Plaintiff, p. 11). Since they were not
wearing coats, Plaintiff walked next to the buildings
nnd under Lamb's marquee. (Deposition of Plaintiff,
p. 12; Deposition of Hugentobler, p. 6; Deposition of
Stoll, et al., p. 44).
Plaintiff walked through an outside door, across
a vestibule, through an inside door and took five or six
steps across the linoleum floor of the caf e. When 10 to
12 feet into the cafe, she fell. (Deposition of Plaintiff,
p. 1B; Deposition of Hngentohler, pp. 6, 7, 13).
The floor where Plaintiff fell was clean and dry.
rrhere was no water or foreign material on it. It was
highly polished and shiny. (Depositions of Stoll, et al.,
pp. G, 7, 24, 29; Deposition of Plaintiff pp. 14, 18; Depot.;ition of Hugentobler p. 7). The vestibule was also dry.
There have been no other accidents. (Deposition of Stoll,
(•t al. p. 2-1-)
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
Rather than follow the format of the Appellant's
Brief which sets up four issues, the Defendants will dis<·uss the only real issue before the court, that is, whether
the affidavits, depositions and answers to interrogatories, setting forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, show that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Rule 56. It is the position of the Defendants that they
do not.
This suit was commenced May 24, 1966, about a year
and a half after the accident. At that time the Plaintiff
claimed that she fell "due to the negligence of Defendnnts in allowing the floor of [their] place of business to
liecome unsafe through the accumulation of snow, water
and slush on said floor ... " (R. 1). After the depositions
of the plaintiff, Defendant Lamb, his employees Margarrt E. Stoll, Rose Timmins and James H. Lee, and the
eompanion of the plaintiff, Gerald G. Hugentobler, had
lie en taken (there being no other witnesses), Defendants
filed Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.17).
After a full hearing on April 21, 1967, before the
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, District Judge, it appeared
without any dispute whatever that there was no snow,
no water and no slush on the floor. Accordingly, the
~fotion was granted hnt with l<'ave to amend. (R. 20).

On May 19, 1967, the Plaintiff filrd an Amended
Complaint in which Defendants were charged with negligence "in the manner and procedure of waxing and care
of the floor ... in applying exr1•ssive amounts of wax
and in maintaining a highly waxed, buffed and polished
floor which was unusually slippery . . . " and in maintaining a floor "without any runner, caqwt, wipe-up
mat or other floor rovering on a snowy, rainy, wet day
." (R. 22, 23).
Dt>fendants r<>newed tlwir Motion for Rumary .J ndgnwnt. It was heard on .JunP 28, 1967, and was grantPd
on A ugnst 22, 1967. (R. 32).
At tlw hearing upon thr Secon ~lotion for Smmnary
.Tndgment, tlH• Plaintiff adoptPd her third \'<'rs:on of
the aecident. In hpr Amended Complaint she ahamlom•d
snow, ·watPr and slush and eharge<l that tlwre was too
much wax on the floor. At tlw h<->aring, howPVPI', as in
lit-'l' Brief, she rhargecl that tlwre was not enough \n1X
on the floor. (RriPf, p. 9).
These arc> not alternative statenwnts of a rlaim.
ThPse are inconsistent, contradictory statements of the
facts upon which the claim is hasPd. The court properly
granted tlw Motion for Smrnmuy .JudgmPnt and t<•rn1!nntPd this litigation.
\Vaxing a floor is 11ot 1wgligern·e. Gaddis I'. Ladies
J,if('rrtnf Cl11l1, -1- rtnh :2<1 Ul, :288 P. :.!cl 783 (19;}3). \Yhat
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evidence is there here of e~cessive amounts of wax or
wax negligently applied¥ Only the statement attributed
to waitress Margaret Stoll, "That floor is awfully slippery, Olive. They waxed it last night." (Deposition of
Plaintiff, p. 14).
Assume this to he true, it does not show negligence.
This was the proof in Gaddis. There is no dispute that
Defendants use a commercial non-skid wax. There is
no suggestion that the manner of application employed
hy the maintenance man Lee was improper (Deposition
of Stoll, et al., pp. 36-40). Indeed, if the affidavit of
Douglas MacGregor is to be considered, the more wax
the better.
Nor is there even a scintilla of evidence that there
should have been a mat on the floor. This floor was dry
hy the admission of everyone. At the risk of belaboring
the obvious ,in Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah
:11, ~:12 P. 2d 210 (1%1), relied npon hy plaintiff, the
!'all orcurred on WPt terrazzo at the entrance to the store.
In De 1-Vee..,.e v. J. C, Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.
2cl 898 ( 1956), also relied upon by Plaintiff, the fall
ncrurred in the entrance to the store. The floor was
wPt and had muddy tracks upon it.
Here the Plaintiff argues that her shoes must have
hec>n wet. Is that the responsibility of the Defendants~
If ordinary care requires mats over interior dry, clean
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linoleum during inclement weather, then such floors are
not suitable for businesses in this climate. Furthermore,
what is the authority for the assertion that everyone
knows wet leather is more slippery than dry leather.
Most bowlers are careful to keep their soles dry so that
their feet will slide.
The position ultimately taken by the Plaintiff was
that the Defendants did not properly maintain the floor.
rrhe charge is that a "dry" mop was ust>d rather than a
"trPatPd" mop. This was madP thP foundation for an Plahorat0 house of cards constructed by Douglas l\lacGregor.
DPf<"ndants ohjectPd to th:s affidavit. It is subject to
several deficiencies.
Even though the floor of the Defendants' restaurant
has not been modified since the accident occurred and
was available for inspection at any time, Douglas Mac(}regor made no tests of the floor. Instead, he used a
f'ample floor "artificially aged" with "synthetic dirt",
whatev<>r that is, rolling the dirt in with "a smooth,
rubber-faced 50 pound roller." (R. 26).
None of these conditions are even suggested to prevail at Lamb's Grill Cafe. Nor does it appear that the
Plaintiff's shoe is the standard.
J~xperiments or tests are not admissible without a

~liowing of similarity of ronditions. 32 C..T.S. 723 (Evi-
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dence, Section 590, Similarity of Conditions). All MacGregor's experiments shows is the co-efficient of friction
between the sample floor and the Plaintiff's shoe. This
E'ays nothing about the Defendants' floor.
But even if sweeping with a broom or dry mop makes
the floor less skid-proof, what would have been the
result of identical tests by MacGregor using a treated
dust mop. Without such a comparison, the relationship
between the dry mop and the floor's slippiness js unknown and the question of proximate cause is left unanswered.
Our final comment on treated dust mops. If liability
in this case is to depend on whether dusting is done with
a dry or treated mop, the user of the wax should in all
fairness be informed of what the mop should be treated
with and the effect of using a dry mop. The lable is in
no sense in the context of a warning to the user.

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff complains that summary judgment is
a drastic action and is not favored. However, she has
hPen given the opportunity of presenting this case in
tlm~e different factual frameworks and under none has
:-\Ii<'

shown any evidence of negligence.
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The maintenance procedures of Defendants seem to
rise above ordinary care. Although the Plaintiff in her
Amended Complaint charged excessive amounts of wax,
she now says, too little wax, too infrequently applied.
Unless the law has reached the point where it is negligence not to wax floors, the Summary Judgment in favor
of Defendants should he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondents
Seventh Floor Continental
Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

